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So far in this first decade of the 21st century, more 
than 1 billion people are subsisting on less than US$1 
per day, and more than 800 million people are 
suffering from hunger. Many countries, most notably 
in Asia, have made spectacular success in reducing 
their overall rates of poverty and hunger, but these 
countries still have regions where poverty remains 
widespread. And despite its high rates of poverty 
reduction, South Asia still has the greatest prevalence 
of underweight children in the world. In Africa, the 
number of poor people increased during the past two 
decades as poverty reduction failed to keep pace with 
population growth.  
Poverty and hunger persist throughout the world, 
even though their eradication has held prominence on 
the international agenda for more than half a century. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations was one of the first global institutions created at 
the end of World War II, because the international 
community recognized the need to ensure adequate food 
for all as a precondition for security and peace. Political 
declarations have continued voicing the goal of reducing 
poverty and hunger, most notably in the Millennium 
Development Declaration adopted by more than 190 
nations. Given the billions of dollars invested and the 
commitment of the international community, why has 
overall progress in eradicating poverty and hunger been 
inadequate? 
Policy instruments that could be useful in reducing 
poverty and hunger are not in short supply. They include 
public investments aimed at promoting pro-poor growth, 
redistributive policies, and social safety nets. Thinking 
and practice on the appropriateness of various policy 
instruments have changed over time; some instruments 
have reappeared in different forms, such as community-
oriented development, and new ones have been 
invented, like microcredit. Choosing the appropriate mix 
of policy instruments to reduce poverty and hunger is at 
the heart of nearly every country’s effort to define its 
development strategy. In view of trade-offs and the need 
for value judgments, the choice of policy instruments is 
inherently political, and views on the right mix of growth-
promoting, redistributive, and environmentally sensitive 
instruments differ across the political spectrum, especially 
between the right and the left. The analytical techniques 
to assess the combinations of policy instruments have 
evolved in past decades—for example, by using 
computable general equilibrium models. Yet analysts 
often ignore the reality that every option for reducing 
poverty comes with at least one of three major 
challenges: political feasibility, administrative feasibility, 
and fiscal feasibility.  
The challenge of political feasibility implies that a 
policy instrument is politically contested and provokes 
political opposition. Instruments that face this challenge, 
such as land reform, are either not adopted at all or are 
implemented half-heartedly. The challenge of 
administrative feasibility points to the need for a well-
functioning and effective public administration to 
implement the respective policy instruments. Policy 
instruments that are technically complex or create scope 
for corruption, like large-scale infrastructure projects, are 
particularly vulnerable to this challenge. The fiscal 
feasibility challenge especially affects policy instruments 
that require a constant flow of financial resources and 
are difficult to maintain over time, especially after donor 
funding ends; agricultural advisory services fall into this 
category. Likewise, policy instruments that require high 
investments, such as large-scale infrastructure, face fiscal 
feasibility issues. The fiscal feasibility challenge can lead 
to political challenges: if the poor lack political voice, the 
financial resources needed to provide services or 
infrastructure are either not invested or not directed 
toward the poor.  
Types of Policy Instruments and Their Challenges 
Various types of policy instruments and their associated 
challenges are presented in Table 1. Any assessment of 
policy instruments must consider country-specific 
conditions, political beliefs, and values, as mentioned 
previously. Thus, the table is not exhaustive but serves 
to illustrate what can be called a feasibility dilemma: 
policy instruments that are not politically contested tend 
to involve the challenges of fiscal feasibility, and vice 
versa; almost all policy instruments face the challenge of 
administrative feasibility; and every type of policy 
instrument involves at least one of these challenges. 
The Political Feasibility Challenge 
Redistributive policy instruments are almost always 
politically contested because, by definition, they create 
winners and losers. The political feasibility challenge is 
particularly pronounced if the losers are politically 
powerful and well connected, as is usually the case with 
redistributive land reform. Not surprisingly, successful 
reforms are typically linked to special political situations, 
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such as major regime changes, as in Taiwan. Making tax 
policies more pro-poor by reducing tax evasion, for 
example, is politically difficult because the losers are 
politically powerful. The same applies to affirmative 
action policies, such as reserving positions in public 
administration or in the education system for socially 
disadvantaged groups. India’s reservation policies are an 
example. Likewise, market liberalization policies are 
politically contested because they create losers. Hence, 
market liberalization policies typically are implemented 
only under the pressure of conditionalities, as was the 
case with structural adjustment lending, or under the 
obligations of international trade negotiations, most 
notably the World Trade Organization. 
Table 1—Feasibility Challenges of Various Types  
of Policy Instruments 
Type of Policy 
Instrument  
(Example) 
Political  
Feasibilityb 
Admini- 
strative  
 Feasibility 
 Fiscal  
 Feasibility
Redistribution of assets 
(land reform) 
Low Low Low/ neutral 
Investment in public 
infrastructure (roads, 
irrigation) 
Low/high Low Low/ neutral 
Investment in public 
services (health, education) High Low Low 
Investment in technology 
(agricultural research, 
extension) 
Low/ 
neutral/ 
higha 
Low 
Low/ 
neutral/ 
higha 
Social safety nets (food- 
for-work or other public 
works, insurance schemes) 
High Low Low 
Subsidies, trade protection 
(regulating producer and 
consumer prices, input 
subsidies for agriculture) 
High Low Low 
Market liberalization policies 
(switching to targeted 
subsidies, trade 
liberalization) 
Low 
Low/ 
neutral/ 
highb 
Low/ 
neutral/ 
highb 
Pro-poor fiscal and  
tax policies Low Low High 
Affirmative action Low Low/neutral Neutral 
Source: Devised by author and informed by discussions with the 
authors of the 2008 World Development Report Agriculture for 
Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007). 
Notes: The table does not include an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the respective policy instruments with regard 
to reducing poverty and hunger. Policy instruments are rated 
“high” on political feasibility if they are not confronted with major 
political opposition. It may, however, be difficult to create 
sufficient political support for the respective instruments. 
aDepending on the type of technology. 
bDepending on the type of market liberalization policy. 
Investment in infrastructure may be politically 
contested for environmental and social reasons, as in 
large-scale infrastructure projects like dams. However, 
developing or improving small-scale infrastructure, like 
rural roads and irrigation facilities, often has a positive 
political payoff. In addition, investments in social services, 
such as health, education, and agricultural advisory 
services, rarely face political contests. As indicated 
previously, the political challenge of these instruments is 
not opposition but the weak political voice of the poor, 
especially the rural poor, which stifles their ability to 
convey their needs and preferences for public 
infrastructure and services. The same applies to social 
safety nets. Nontargeted subsidies and trade protection 
are typically promoted politically by special-interest 
groups. They do not face general political opposition but 
are confronted with criticism from international financial 
institutions, donor agencies, and the domestic policy 
circles that promote market liberalism. 
Most public investments in new technologies are not 
politically contested because they have the potential to 
increase the income of the poor while avoiding the 
political opposition inherent in redistributive instruments. 
However, some new technologies are politically 
contested, either because of environmental concerns, as 
with agricultural biotechnology, or because they are 
expected to have negative effects on the poor, as with 
agricultural mechanization in labor-abundant economies.  
The Administrative Feasibility Challenge 
Almost all policy instruments are accompanied by the 
challenge of administrative feasibility (Table 1). This 
challenge is particularly pronounced if policy instruments 
are transaction intensive, implying that they require 
frequent activities across a variety of locations. At the 
same time, instruments that are discretionary or specific 
are difficult to standardize. Further, the transaction costs 
of monitoring and supervising such activities are very 
high. Services, such as primary education or agricultural 
extension, fall into this category: they must be provided 
every day, all over the country, and they require 
dedicated staff to meet the specific learning needs of 
children or the specific knowledge demands of farmers. 
Other factors that contribute to the administrative 
feasibility challenge are scope for corruption and 
technical complexity. Large-scale infrastructure projects 
are affected by both factors. Many irrigation projects in 
Africa failed because they were not well designed for the 
specific hydrological conditions and because corruption in 
procurement lowered the quality of their construction. 
State intervention into markets—for example, restrictions 
on the marketing of agricultural products—typically 
creates scope for rent seeking and corruption, even if 
such interventions are not technically complex. 
Accordingly, policies that reduce the level of state 
intervention in the economy, such as market 
liberalization, are among the few policy instruments that 
have advantages in terms of administrative feasibility. 
However, in areas where market failures are inherent, 
such as electricity utilities, privatization can foster 
corruption because it requires effective regulation to 
prevent corruption. Likewise, the move from general 
price supports to targeted subsidies involves an 
administrative feasibility challenge. Targeting subsidies, 
such as subsidized food grains, to individual households 
is a complex process subject to corruption, as India’s 
Public Distribution System has shown. 
The Fiscal Feasibility Challenge 
Policy instruments that require a constant flow of 
budgetary resources, such as social services and social 
protection programs, are typically confronted with 
problems of fiscal feasibility. Teachers and health facility 
staff, for example, often do not receive their salaries 
regularly, which results in high absentee rates and low 
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service quality. If extension agents lack operational 
resources, such as transportation to get to the field, they 
cannot be effective. Large-scale infrastructure projects 
are also confronted with fiscal feasibility challenges, but 
they are more easily financed by donor funding. In the 
case of infrastructure such as roads, drinking water 
facilities, and irrigation, maintenance is particularly 
susceptible to the fiscal feasibility challenge. Market 
interventions differ widely with regard to their fiscal 
feasibility implications because some, such as import 
tariffs, generate budgetary resources, while others, such 
as input or export subsidies, require financial resources.  
Overcoming the Feasibility Dilemma 
Each type of policy instrument faces at least one of the 
three feasibility challenges, and many are confronted 
with two (Table 1). Current efforts to formulate 
development strategies often include assessing the fiscal 
feasibility challenge because it is the focus of 
international financial institutions and donor 
organizations. In contrast, the challenges of political and 
administrative feasibility often receive less attention. 
Although this brief provides some guidelines, in practice, 
the limitations of policy instruments depend on context-
specific conditions. Having experts and stakeholders 
participate in assessing feasibility challenges may foster a 
realistic country-specific appraisal. The assessments 
could be integrated in the participatory processes of 
developing poverty reduction strategy papers or other 
development strategies or sectoral policies.  
An assessment of feasibility challenges is useful in 
devising strategies for dealing with them. Three 
strategies are possible: (1) selecting an instrument that is 
“second best” from an economic perspective but involves 
fewer feasibility challenges than the “first best” 
instrument; (2) adjusting the design of the policy 
instrument or its implementation modalities to reduce the 
challenges confronted; and (3) improving the political, 
administrative, and fiscal conditions. While the first and 
second strategies can be applied in the short term, the 
third strategy requires a longer time commitment. The 
second and third strategies are summarized in Table 2. 
Strategies to Deal with the Political  
Feasibility Challenge 
For redistributive policy instruments, one important 
strategy to improve political feasibility is to compensate 
the losers. In the case of land reform, for example, the 
state could compensate landowners. However, this leads 
to the fiscal feasibility challenge. Packaging popular with 
unpopular policy reforms can also reduce the political 
feasibility challenge. Some policy reforms can be 
introduced “by stealth” (“below the radar” of public 
attention). The Mexican program of poverty alleviation, 
Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación (Progresa, 
now Oportunidades), which introduced direct cash 
transfers, was piloted in a remote area to avoid possible 
opposition until policymakers could prove its 
effectiveness. Policymakers can also use “windows of 
opportunity,” such as those arising after a change of 
government. One way to promote the introduction of 
targeted subsidies is improving transparency about the 
extent to which nonpoor people benefit from untargeted 
subsidies. For example, increasing transparency on the 
extent to which better-off farmers benefit from 
agricultural input subsidies and from price supports can 
help to promote pro-poor reforms. 
Table 2—Strategies to Overcome the Feasibility 
Challenges 
Adjusting Policy Design 
and Implementation 
Improving the  
Underlying Conditions 
1.  Political feasibility challenge 
• Compensating the 
losers; packaging 
unpopular with popular 
measures  
• Using “windows of 
opportunity”; stealth  
• Increasing 
transparency 
• Strengthening political voice of 
poor people 
  –  Democratization  
  –  Political decentralization 
• Social mobilization/political 
organization  
2.  Administrative feasibility challenge 
• Reducing technical 
complexity 
• Reducing scope for 
corruption 
• Working with 
nongovernmental 
organizations 
• Supply-side reform strategies  
–  Increased capacity and incentives 
–  Administrative decentralization  
• Demand-side reform strategies  
–  Social audit 
–  Citizen report cards 
–  Right to information 
3.  Fiscal feasibility challenge 
• Recovering costs 
• Targeting 
• Reform of the budgetary process 
• Reform of tax system 
Source: Devised by author. 
A major challenge to reducing poverty and hunger is 
the lack of political voice of poor and food-insecure 
people. The problem is most severe for the rural poor, as 
emphasized by “urban bias” literature. The social and 
political mobilization of the rural poor is undoubtedly an 
important factor—perhaps the most important factor—in 
overcoming the political feasibility challenge. The type of 
political regime affects the opportunities that rural poor 
have to develop their voice. Democracies have a better 
record in avoiding famines, as Amartya Sen has shown, 
but the relationship between the type of political regime 
and success in reducing poverty is complex. A range of 
nondemocratic regimes had remarkable success in 
reducing poverty. These regimes had strong 
development orientation, in some cases combined with 
an egalitarian ideology, as in China. Emphasis on political 
decentralization in recent decades is associated with the 
hope that bringing government closer to the people will 
increase the rural poor’s voice. However, whether it is 
easier to prevent local elites from capturing development 
resources than it is national elites depends on country-
specific political and socioeconomic conditions. 
Strategies to Deal with the Administrative 
Feasibility Challenge 
One short-run strategy to deal with the administrative 
feasibility challenge is reducing the technical complexity 
of policy instruments and their scope for corruption. For 
example, the pumps now promoted for supplying 
drinking water in rural Ghana are technically less 
complex than those used earlier, enabling community 
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members to maintain and repair the pumps themselves. 
Offering public works programs at a wage below the 
market is a targeting strategy that eliminates the need to 
identify target households and reduces the scope for 
corruption. In so-called failed states—where public 
administration is virtually absent in large parts of the 
country—working with nongovernmental organizations 
may prove to be an important strategy. In the 
agricultural sector, producer organizations can play a 
major role in providing services. In India, dairy 
cooperatives provide livestock services to more than 12 
million households, benefiting poor households, and 
women in particular, who may not otherwise be reached 
by public or private service providers. 
In the medium and long term, the most promising 
option for overcoming the administrative feasibility 
challenge is to improve the quality of public 
administration. Efforts to improve public-sector 
management have a long history. Early efforts focused on 
the “supply side” of public administration by providing 
training; promoting merit-based recruitment and 
promotion; adjusting the pay scales of civil service 
employees; and strengthening systems used in managing 
procurement, auditing, and public expenditures. More 
recent approaches target demand-side reforms, 
strengthening the capacity of citizens to demand public 
services and hold service providers accountable. 
Examples include citizen report cards, social auditing, 
public-service delivery surveys, and participatory planning 
and budgeting. Civil society organizations play an 
important role in these strategies, as exemplified by 
India’s “right-to-information” campaign. 
Donor policies can contribute to overcoming the 
administrative feasibility challenge in several ways. Donor 
coordination, as agreed in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, reduces the administrative burden caused 
by fragmented development assistance. Administrative 
feasibility is also enhanced by avoiding externally 
imposed solutions at odds with local institutions, needs, 
and practices. Another important strategy is avoiding 
“blueprinting,” instead choosing flexible and adaptable 
approaches that provide opportunities for learning. 
Strategies to Deal with the Fiscal  
Feasibility Challenge 
Among the available strategies for coping with the fiscal 
feasibility challenge are cost recovery approaches, 
including charging user fees for drinking or irrigation 
water or for agricultural extension. These approaches 
have their own political feasibility challenges. Moreover, 
making them pro-poor may require special provisions, 
such as exempting the basic consumption of the 
commodity from user charges. Targeting of subsidies is 
another strategy, even though this approach is confronted 
with both political and administrative feasibility challenges, 
as indicated previously. 
Strategies to promote fiscal feasibility at the system 
level include reforms of the budgetary process and the tax 
system. Increasing tax revenues makes it possible to 
expand public spending for poverty reduction without 
jeopardizing macroeconomic stability goals. In many 
countries, the tax system is far from pro-poor, because 
wealthier households are in a much better position to 
avoid paying taxes. Increasing the contribution that 
better-off citizens make to a country’s tax revenues could 
go a long way in meeting the fiscal feasibility challenges 
of pro-poor policy instruments, even though the political 
feasibility challenge of this strategy has to be met.  
Conclusion 
Progress in achieving the First Millennium Development 
Goal—to halve hunger and poverty by 2015—has proved 
difficult, but reaching the “other half” of the poor and 
food insecure is an even greater challenge. Nevertheless, 
a world free of hunger and poverty is possible. Focusing 
on the three types of feasibility challenges discussed in 
this brief is an important step toward this goal. 
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